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Anderson v. Mandalay Corp., Nev. Adv. Op. 82 (Oct. 10, 2015)1
TORTS: VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Summary
The Court determined (1) NRS § 41.745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry; (2) a
reasonable jury could find it “reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the
case considering the nature and scope of his . . . employment” that a hotel employee would rape
a hotel guest; and (3) direct negligence claims against an employer are not futile when a
reasonable jury could conclude under the facts that the employer could reasonably foresee the
employee’s unlawful act.
Background
On September 8, 2008, Cristie Anderson came to Las Vegas to attend a trade show. After
completing her work-related duties, Anderson went out for dinner and drinks with coworkers,
and returned to her room at Mandalay, at 2 a.m., intoxicated. Surveillance footage shows
Anderson shared an elevator with Alonzo Monroy Gonzalez, a Mandalay employee, when
returning to her room. After Anderson entered her room and went to sleep, Gonzalez entered
Anderson’s room without authorization and raped her.
Gonzalez worked as a House Person at Mandalay, and his late shift had little supervision.
Mandalay provided Gonzalez with a keycard that opened the guest rooms on his assigned floors.
Prior to hiring Gonzalez, Mandalay performed a criminal background check using the social
security number Gonzalez provided, which indicated no criminal record. Mandalay solicited
Gonzalez’s employment references and filled out I-9 documents, however, it is not clear whether
Mandalay contacted those references or properly updated Gonzalez’s information in his I-9.
Gonzalez’s prior disciplinary history shows Mandalay suspended him for 31 days
because of his misuse of employee radios, and lies about such misuse. Additionally, Gonzalez
allegedly harassed and threatened a female co-worker. At trial, Anderson presented evidence that
Mandalay employees have a history of sexual assaults on Mandalay premises, along with a
history of unauthorized entry into occupied rooms. An expert report indicated Mandalay had
insufficient security when Gonzalez attacked Anderson, as well as ongoing security defects.
The district court granted Mandalay’s motion for summary judgment on Anderson’s
vicarious liability claim, concluding NRS § 41.745(1) and Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 2 barred
vicarious liability against Mandalay because Gonzalez’s acts were truly independent, not
committed in the course of the task assigned, and not reasonably foreseeable. The district court
also denied as futile Anderson’s request for leave to amend to add a direct negligence claim.
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Mandalay was not entitled to summary judgment.
The Court reviews summary judgment de novo. 3 Summary judgment is improper
whenever “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”4 When reviewing
the record, “the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.”5
NRS § 41.745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry.
An employer is vicariously liable for employees’ intentional torts when an employee’s
act is “reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the
nature and scope of his or her employment.” 6 These factual and circumstantial inquiries are
issues of fact, not legal determinations. The Legislature clarified this reasonable foreseeability
standard, relying on the definition of reasonable foreseeability that emerged from premises
liability cases, stating, “[C]onduct of an employee is reasonably foreseeable if a person of
ordinary intelligence and prudence could have reasonably anticipated the conduct and the
probability of injury.” 7 Simply put, the reasonable foreseeability standard requires a factual
inquiry.
A reasonable jury could conclude Gonzalez’s act was reasonably foreseeable.
This Court has considered reasonable foreseeability under NRS § 41.745(1)(c) in only
one published case.8 In Wood, as a matter of law, an employer could not reasonably foresee an
employee’s sexual assault of another worker in the building because the employee had no
criminal history, the employer required higher proof of identification and immigration status, and
the employer had received no sexual harassment complaints over the last ten years. 9
Distinguishably, here, “the prior on-premises attacks, employees’ regular keycard abuse,
Gonzalez’s disciplinary history, and Mandalay’s decision to provide Gonzalez keyed access to
guest rooms with minimal supervision” allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Gonzalez’s
sexual assault on a Mandalay guest was foreseeable.
Whether other states would find that Gonzalez’s act to be outside the scope of his
employment is irrelevant, because the proper inquiry is reasonable foreseeability. Further, other
states have in fact concluded sexual assault can be reasonably foreseeable either through a
vicarious liability inquiry or a direct negligence inquiry. Thus, under the facts and circumstances
here, a reasonable jury could conclude Gonzalez’s act was reasonably foreseeable.
The district court erred in concluding it would be futile for Anderson to amend her complaint.
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Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029.
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While a court’s decision on a motion for leave to amend is generally reviewed for abuse
of discretion, futility is a question of law reviewed de novo.10 Anderson’s proposed amendments
are not futile because a reasonable jury could conclude Gonzalez’s attack was reasonably
foreseeable. An unlawful act will not supersede causation if the act was foreseeable.11 Further,
the district court’s reliance on NRS § 651.015 was erroneous because the statute only applies to
injury caused by a “person who is not an employee under the control or supervision of the owner,”
and Gonzalez was a Mandalay employee.12
Conclusion
NRS 41.745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry, and a reasonable jury could conclude
Mandalay could reasonably foresee Gonzalez’s sexual assault of Anderson because of his
disciplinary history, unfettered keycard access with minimal supervision, and Mandalay’s notice
of its employees’ history of sexual assault and unauthorized entry. Anderson’s proposed
amendment to add a direct negligence claim was not futile because Gonzalez’s unlawful act was
foreseeable, and thus does not supersede causation. The Court reversed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment and denial of Anderson’s motion for leave to amend, and remanded the
matter to the district court for further proceedings.
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